King is in prosecuting the American war. For, in truth, he alone is
Minister, and his will governs with absolute sway. At the same time
the powers which he has given to Lord Howe appear, from his
declaration in America, to be most ample. That, however, I rather
attribute to what is deemed the art of government, than to any pacific
or redressing intention. We can never forget the perfidy of making
Lord Botetourt declare to the assembly, that the revenue acts should
be repealed, when in fact no such thing was intended or done; and the
Secretary of State being ordered to tell the agents of Congress, that
his Majesty had received their petition very graciously, and from the
importance of it would lay it before his two Houses of Parliament,
when, at the same time, the same Secretary wrote, by his Majesty's
commands, to all the governors of America, denominating that very
Congress an illegal meeting, their grievances pretended, and ordering
them to prevent their meeting again. These facts are too decisive to
leave a doubt of the credit that is due to the promises of this Court,
and, at this very time, they are abusing the Howes for negotiating;
the language of Court being, "we sent them to use their hands, and
they are employing their heads."

The Rockingham part of the opposition are determined upon seceding
from Parliament, in which Lord Shelburne, Lord Camden, and the Duke of
Grafton refuse to accompany them for two reasons; 1st, because the
feelings of the public are not high enough for so decisive a measure;
and, 2dly, because the others will not agree to make the great
fundamental abuse of the constitution, as well as the temporary
misconduct of government, the groundwork of that secession. In a word,
because they will not declare, that the object of the measure is to
obtain the abolition of corruption, and not merely the change of those
who minister it. This schism will, however, reduce opposition so as to
leave the Court at perfect ease from that quarter.

I thank you for the magnanimity of your sentiments towards our
friends, on the supposition that the late occurrences are events of
consequence. I am by no means of that opinion. After the affair of
Long Island, the loss of New York was inevitable; but is not the
successful army still faced and kept at bay, by that over which it is
supposed to have obtained, these decisive advantages? Could any one
expect more from a new raised army, than that it should face the