d from the Southern banks, the revolted States could never
have maintained so prolonged a contest. Organized as now proposed, these
new banks, and all who held their notes, must have sustained the
Government. Nations expend millions yearly in erecting forts and
maintaining, even in peace, large armies and navies to preserve the
Government. But necessary as these may be, they would not be more
important than the system now proposed as a security for the
preservation of the Government.
My last suggestion is, that as regards all such United States loans, as
during the war shall become the basis of this system, the time of
payment shall be made twenty years instead of five, so as, with the
modifications above proposed, to insure the cooperation of the banks,
and the success of the system. As this plan is deemed essential to save
our finances, to suppress the rebellion, and maintain the Union, why
incur any hazard on such a question as this? In all our wars, including
the present, we have issued bonds running twenty years to maturity, and
the bonds, redeemable in 1881, are scarcely at par. Why, then, issue a
stock of less value, which may fail to accomplish the great object, when
a better security would certainly succeed? I fully agree in the opinion
expressed by the Secretary, against 'a fixed interest of six per cent.
on a great debt, for twenty years,' if it can be avoided; but I also
concur in that portion of his report in which he says: 'No very early
day will probably witness the reduction of the public debt to the amount
required as a basis for secured circulation.' To that extent, then,
would I enlarge the time for the maturity of the bonds. Surely, if this
be necessary to secure the cooperation of the banks, and the capital of
the country, there should be no hesitation. Even if the system, based
only on the bonds of short date, should ultimately succeed, the loss, in
the interim, from a redundant and depreciated currency, would far exceed
any benefit derived from the substitution of five-twenties for twenty
year bonds. By Census Table 35, our wealth in 1850, was $7,135,780,228,
and in 1860, $16,159,616,068, the ratio of increase during the decade
being 126.45 per cent.; at which rate, our wealth in 1870 would be
$36,583,450,585, and in 1880, $82,843,222,849. Surely, then, at these
periods, it would be much easier to liquidate this debt than in 1867.
But, were it otherwise, the immediate gain from decreased expenditu
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