ght she, the very day after it was ratified by her people, disregard
it altogether, secede, and establish a constitution directly repugnant
to the Constitution of the Union? If so, written constitutions are worse
than useless; they are not obligatory, there is no penalty for their
violation; obedience to them cannot be enforced; there is no government
but that of opinion, fluctuating and uncertain, undefined and
undefinable, which is paramount to the fundamental law. This is what the
_despots of Europe_ call our government, and why they _predict_ its
downfall--a prediction now in the course of fulfilment, if these
anarchical principles can be recognized as the doctrines of the
Constitution.

There is no difference between the doctrines or acts of Jefferson and
Jackson on this subject. Both admit nullification or secession as a
revolutionary measure; and the new doctrine of suspending a law by a
nullifying edict finds not the remotest support from Mr. Jefferson. In
his celebrated draught of the Kentucky resolutions, so much relied on by
Carolina, we have seen, he speaks of these powers of the people of any
State as 'a _natural_ right,' and so is revolution; and the cases to
which he refers are such as render a revolution unavoidable, namely, if
Congress pass an act 'so palpably against the Constitution as to amount
to an undisguised declaration that the compact is not meant to be the
measure of the powers of the General Government.' Is there now such a
case? if there is, revolution is justifiable. Why then ask any other
remedy than revolution for a case where revolution would be unavoidable?
And SECESSION IS REVOLUTION. But did Mr. Jefferson mean to say that
whenever any State should place its laws or Constitution, by
nullification or secession, in opposition to the laws of the General
Government, that the power of the General Government must not be
exerted? The very reverse. The act of Congress of the 3d of March,
1807, signed and approved by Mr. Jefferson as President, expressly
authorizes the President of the United States to 'employ such part of
the land and naval force of the United States as may be necessary' to
execute 'the laws of the United States.' Does this mean, as General
Hayne tells us in his proclamation, to execute the laws against
insurgents not sustained by any law of the State? No; this act was
passed at the very time when Pennsylvania was proceeding, by virtue of a
law of the State, to execute, by an