turers. Even if it were beyond question sound in principle to
exclude goods that can be bought more cheaply by trade, it is very
doubtful whether any net good could have resulted from this policy
as it has been in fact applied and followed. The frequent and
unpredictable changes have been a great evil, and have again and again
brought unmerited losses to the many in business and still greater
and unearned gains to a favored few. It is incredible that such a
hit-or-miss, in large part selfishly determined, policy could have
been an important cause of our national prosperity. The fundamental
causes of the general high wages and popular welfare that we have
enjoyed is to be found rather in our rich natural resources,
our capacity for self-government with free institutions, and the
industrial energies of our people.[13]

The revision of the tariff of 1913, viewed with non-partizan eyes,
appears to have been carried out, to say the least, as consistently
with regard to its professed doctrine, and as little influenced by the
malevolent arts of the old-time Congressional lobby, as any debated
tariff act in our history. It still contains on the whole a large
measure of protection. Under various pretexts such as the danger of a
flood of cheap goods after the close of the great war, attempts will
be made to make it still more prohibitive. But one lesson of our
tariff history is that such an act should be given a period of fair
trial before extensive changes are made in it. Even further reductions
should be cautiously undertaken and put into effect gradually. If the
attempt is made through temporary rates to reduce the shock of the
trade adjustments, of the "dumping" after the war, then the devising
and administration of such measures should be delegated to an
expert, disinterested, permanent tariff board. The task is to prevent
temporary "unfair competition" and sudden changes, rather than to
raise permanent barriers to fair trade.[14]

[Footnote 1: It is evident that it is only through _ad valorem_ rates
that it is possible to compare the average rate of duty for one tariff
act, with that for another. As, however, every tariff act is made up
of both specific and _ad valorem_ duties, it is only at the end of the
year that an average _ad valorem_ rate can be estimated by comparing
the total of duties collected with the total estimated value of the
goods imported. Average _ad valorem_ rates are estimated in this way
both on the