[240] Ibid. p. 157.
[241] Ibid. p. 158.
[242] "Animals and Plants under Domestication," vol. i. p. 291.
[243] Though hardly necessary, it may be well to remark that the views here
advocated in no way depend upon the truth of the doctrine of Spontaneous
Generation.
[244] Vol. iii. p. 808.
[245] This is hardly an exact representation of Mr. Darwin's view. On his
theory, if a favourable variation happens to arise (the external
circumstances remaining the same), it will yet be preserved.
[246] See 2nd edition, p. 113.
[247] "Essays, Philosophical and Theological," Truebner and Co., First
Series, 1866, p. 190. "Every relative disability may be read two ways. A
disqualification in the nature of thought for knowing _x_ is, from the
other side, a disqualification in the nature of _x_ from being known. To
say then that the First Cause is wholly removed from our apprehension is
not simply a disclaimer of faculty on our part: it is a charge of inability
against the First Cause too. The dictum about it is this: 'It is a Being
that may exist out of knowledge, but that is precluded from entering within
the sphere of knowledge.' We are told in one breath that this Being must be
in every sense 'perfect, complete, total--including in itself all power,
and transcending all law' (p. 38); and in another that this perfect and
omnipotent One is totally incapable of revealing any one of an infinite
store of attributes. Need we point out the contradictions which this
position involves? If you abide by it, you deny the Absolute and Infinite
in the very act of affirming it, for, in debarring the First Cause from
self-revelation, you impose a limit on its nature. And in the very act of
declaring the First Cause incognizable, you do not permit it to remain
unknown. For that only is unknown, of which you can neither affirm nor deny
any predicate; here you deny the power of self-disclosure to the
'Absolute,' of which therefore something is known;--viz., that nothing can
be known!"
[248] Loc. cit. p. 108.
[249] Loc. cit. p. 43.
[250] Loc. cit. p. 46.
[251] Mr. J. Martineau, in his "Essays," vol. i. p. 211, observes, "Mr.
Spencer's conditions of pious worship are hard to satisfy; there must be
between the Divine and human no communion of thought, relations of
conscience, or approach of affection." ... "But you cannot constitute a
religion out of mystery alone, any more than out of knowledge alone; nor
can you measure the rel
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