ated against even _derivative creation_.[293] This, however, there is
no doubt, was not really meant; and indeed, in the passage before quoted
and criticised, the possibility of the Divine ordination of each variation
is spoken of as a tenable view. He says ("Origin of Species," p. 569), "I
see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the
religious feelings of anyone;" and he speaks of life "having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one," which is
_more_ than the dogma of creation actually requires. We find then that no
_in_compatibility is asserted (by any scientific writers worthy of mention)
between "evolution" and the co-operation of the Divine will; while the same
"evolution" has been shown to be thoroughly acceptable to the most orthodox
theologians who repudiate the intrusion of the supernatural into the domain
of nature. A more complete harmony could scarcely be desired.

But if we may never hope to find, in physical nature, evidence of
supernatural action, what sort of action might we expect to find there,
looking at it from a theistic point of view? Surely an action the results
of which harmonize with man's reason,[294] which is orderly, which {276}
disaccords with the action of blind chance and with the "fortuitous
concourse of atoms" of Democritus; but at the same time an action which, as
to its modes, ever, in parts, and in ultimate analysis, eludes our grasp,
and the modes of which are different from those by which we should have
attempted to accomplish such ends.

Now, this is just what we _do_ find. The harmony, the beauty, and the order
of the physical universe are the themes of continual panegyrics on the part
of naturalists, and Mr. Darwin, as the Duke of Argyll remarks,[295]
"exhausts every form of words and of illustration by which intention or
mental purpose can be described"[296] when speaking of the wonderfully
complex adjustments to secure the fertilization of orchids. Also, we find
co-existing with this harmony a mode of proceeding so different from that
of man as (the direct supernatural action eluding us) to form a
stumbling-block to many in the way of their recognition of Divine action at
all: although nothing can be more inconsistent than to speak of the first
cause as utterly inscrutable and incomprehensible, and at the same time to
expect to find traces of a mode of action exactly similar to our own. It is
surely enough if the results