for being destitute, at one and the same time, of both authoritative
sanction and the support of reason and observation.

To return to the bearing of moral conceptions on "Natural Selection," it
seems that, from the reasons given in this chapter, we may safely
affirm--1. That "Natural Selection" could not have produced, from the
sensations of pleasure and pain experienced by brutes, a higher degree of
morality than was useful; therefore it could have produced any amount of
"beneficial habits," but not abhorrence of certain acts as impure and
sinful.

2. That it could not have developed that high esteem for acts of care and
tenderness to the aged and infirm which actually exists, but would rather
have perpetuated certain low social conditions which obtain in some savage
localities.

3. That it could not have evolved from ape sensations the noble virtue of a
Marcus Aurelius, or the loving but manly devotion of a St. Lewis.

4. That, alone, it could not have given rise to the maxim _fiat justitia,
ruat coelum_. [Page 207]

5. That the interval between material and formal morality is one altogether
beyond its power to traverse.

Also, that the anticipatory character of moral principles is a fatal bar to
that explanation of their origin which is offered to us by Mr. Herbert
Spencer. And, finally, that the solution of that origin proposed recently
by Sir John Lubbock is a mere version of simple utilitarianism, appealing
to the pleasure or safety of the individual, and therefore utterly
incapable of solving the riddle it attacks.

Such appearing to be the case as to the power of "Natural Selection," we,
nevertheless, find moral conceptions--_formally_ moral ideas--not only
spread over the civilized world, but manifesting themselves unmistakeably
(in however rudimentary a condition, and however misapplied) amongst the
lowest and most degraded of savages. If from amongst these, individuals can
be brought forward who seem to be destitute of any moral conception,
similar cases also may easily be found in highly civilized communities.
Such cases tell no more against moral intuitions than do cases of
colour-blindness or idiotism tell against sight and reason. We have thus a
most important and conspicuous fact, the existence of which is fatal to the
theory of "Natural Selection," as put forward of late by Mr. Darwin and his
most ardent followers. It must be remarked, however, that whatever force
this fact may have against a be