ng good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet
to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not
so calling him, to hell I will go."

This is unquestionably an admirable sentiment on the part of Mr. Mill (with
which every absolute moralist will agree), but it contains a complete
refutation of his own position, and is a capital instance[209] of the
vigorous life of moral intuition in one who professes to have eliminated
any fundamental distinction between the "right" and the "expedient." For if
an action is morally good, and to be done, merely in proportion to the
amount of pleasure it secures, and morally bad and to be avoided as tending
to misery, and if it could be _proved_ that by calling God good--whether He
is so or not, in our sense of the term,--we could secure a maximum of
pleasure, and by refusing to do so we should incur endless torment,
clearly, on utilitarian principles, the flattery would be good.

Mr. Mill, of course, must also mean that, in the matter in question, all
men would do well to act with him. Therefore, he must mean that it would be
well for all to accept (on the hypothesis above given) infinite and final
misery for all as the result of the pursuit of happiness as the only end.

It must be recollected that in consenting to worship this unholy God, Mr.
Mill is not asked to do harm to his neighbour, so that his refusal reposes
simply on his perception of the immorality of the requisition. It is also
noteworthy that an omnipotent Deity is supposed incapable of altering Mr.
Mill's mind and moral perceptions.

Mr. Mill's decision is right, but it is difficult indeed to see how, {195}
without the recognition of an "absolute morality," he can justify so utter
and final an abandonment of all utility in favour of a clear and distinct
moral perception.

These two ideas, the "right" and the "useful," being so distinct here and
now, a greater difficulty meets us with regard to their origin from some
common source, than met us before when considering the first beginnings of
certain bodily structures. For the distinction between the "right" and the
"useful" is so fundamental and essential that not only does the idea of
benefit not enter into the idea of duty, but we see that the very fact of
an act _not_ being beneficial to us makes it the more praiseworthy, while
gain tends to diminish the merit of an action. Yet this idea, "right," thus
excluding, as it does, all ref