r, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
Reply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous."
Reply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being
without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison
with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all
corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first
body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]
Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful
and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered
as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one
predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Obj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and
no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the
division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful
would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore
this division is incorrect.
Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,
and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural
body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
a
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