force assembled on the Bohemian frontiers to return with precipitation
to cover the capital? This would have been too presumptuous an idea. He
probably fancied himself strong enough, with 400,000 men, led on by
himself and the ablest generals of the age, to cope, if even Austria
should declare against him, with all three powers; especially if he
presumed that he should be able to force all the combined armies united
to a general engagement, and to annihilate them with a single blow. The
proposals for peace were rejected: not the slightest disposition was
shewn to treat, and the armistice of two months answered no other
purpose than to convince Austria of the absolute necessity of joining
the cause of the allies, and exerting all her energies to conquer that
peace by the sword, which there was not the least hope of accomplishing
by negotiation. By the accession of Austria the grand alliance had now
gained a manifest superiority, as well in regard to the number of troops
as to the geographical advantages of the theatre of war and resources.
After the renewal of hostilities Napoleon still seemed determined to
pursue his plan of advancing beyond the Oder. The allies were not to be
deceived by these demonstrations, but unexpectedly took post with their
main force in Bohemia, along the Saxon frontier, leaving in Silesia and
Brandenburg, where the crown-prince of Sweden had by this time arrived
with his gallant troops, armies strong enough to keep him in check by a
vigorous defensive system. The great Bohemian army was destined for
offensive operations. This plan was equally grand and judicious.
Silesia, and all Saxony, to the Elbe, could not fail, in consequence, to
be lost to Napoleon. That river, while he had only Prussia and Russia to
encounter, was a sure support in his rear; but no sooner had Austria
declared herself than it was no longer of any military consequence.
Dresden was the central point for the French army. There were organized
all the military bureaus, and all the branches of administration for the
economy of the army. The allies opened the campaign with a hasty advance
upon that important city. If the enterprise proved successful, its
consequences would be incalculable; if it miscarried, nothing would be
lost for the grand object; and at any rate the expedition would be a
diversion, which would immediately draw the French out of Silesia.
Napoleon now saw how egregiously he was deceived in his reckoning. He
ha