we will
only establish this distinction, that it is just to behave ourselves so
towards our enemies; but that to treat our friends thus is an injustice,
because we ought to live with them uprightly, and without any deceit." "I
think so," said Euthydemus. "But," continued Socrates, "when a general
sees that his troops begin to be disheartened, if he make them believe
that a great reinforcement is coming to him, and by that stratagem
inspires fresh courage into the soldiers, under what head shall we put
this lie?" "Under the head of justice," answered Euthydemus. "And when
a child will not take the physic that he has great need of, and his
father makes it be given him in a mess of broth, and by that means the
child recovers his health, to which shall we ascribe this deceit?" "To
justice likewise." "And if a man, who sees his friend in despair, and
fears he will kill himself, hides his sword from him, or takes it out of
his hands by force, what shall we say of this violence?" "That it is
just," replied Euthydemus. "Observe what you say," continued Socrates;
"for it follows from your answers that we are not always obliged to live
with our friends uprightly, and without any deceit, as we agreed we
were." "No; certainly we are not, and if I may be permitted to retract
what I said, I change my opinion very freely." "It is better," said
Socrates, "to change an opinion than to persist in a wrong one. But
there is still one point which we must not pass over without inquiry, and
this relates to those whose deceits are prejudicial to their friends; for
I ask you, which are most unjust, they who with premeditate design cheat
their friends, or they who do it through inadvertency?" "Indeed," said
Euthydemus, "I know not what to answer, nor what to believe, for you have
so fully refuted what I have said, that what appeared to me before in one
light appears to me now in another. Nevertheless, I will venture to say
that he is the most unjust who deceives his friend deliberately." "Do
you think," said Socrates, "that one may learn to be just and honest, as
well as we learn to read and write?" "I think we may." "Which," added
Socrates, "do you take to be the most ignorant, he who reads wrong on
purpose, or he who reads wrong because he can read no better?" "The last
of them," answered Euthydemus; "for the other who mistakes for pleasure
need not mistake when he pleases." "Then," inferred Socrates, "he who
reads wrong delib
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