avoid these mistakes. This type of
reasoning may be said to ascribe a utilitarian value to the study of
history. It assumes that historical knowledge is directly and
immediately applicable to vital problems of the present day.
Now the difficulty with this value, as with many others that seem to
have the sanction of reason, is that it does not possess the sanction of
practical test. While knowledge doubtless affects in some way the
present policy of our own government, it would be very hard to prove
that the influence is in any way a direct influence. It is extremely
doubtful whether the knowledge that the voters have of the history of
their country will be recalled and applied at the ballot box next
November. I do not say that the study of history that has been going on
in the common schools for a generation will be entirely without effect
upon the coming election. I simply maintain that this influence will be
indirect,--but I believe that it will be none the less profound. One's
vote at the next election will be determined largely by immediate and
present conditions. But the way in which one interprets these conditions
cannot help being profoundly influenced by one's historical study or
lack of such study.
If it is clear, then, that the study of history cannot be justified upon
a purely utilitarian basis, we may pass to the consideration of other
values that have been proposed. The specialist in history, whose right
to legislate upon this matter I have just called into question, will
probably emphasize the disciplinary value of this study. Specialists are
commonly enthusiastic over the disciplinary value of their special
subjects. Their own minds have been so well developed by the pursuit of
their special branches that they are impelled to recommend the same
discipline for all minds. Again, we must not blame the specialist in
history, for you and I think the same about our own special type of
activity.
From the disciplinary point of view, the study of history is supposed to
give one the mastery of a special method of reasoning. Historical method
involves, above all else, the careful sifting of evidence, the minutest
scrutiny of sources in order to judge whether or not the records are
authentic, and the utmost care in coming to conclusions. Now it will be
generally agreed that these are desirable types of skill to possess
whether one is an historian or a lawyer or a teacher or a man of
business. And yet, as in al
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