ight not perhaps be willing to surrender Savoy. He certainly was not
willing to contest that point with them, but plainly and explicitly (as
I understood him) proposed to let them keep it,--though he knew (or he
was much worse informed than he would be thought) that England had at
the very time agreed on the terms of a treaty with the King of Sardinia,
of which the recovery of Savoy was the _casus foederis_. In the teeth of
this treaty, Mr. Fox proposed a direct and most scandalous breach of our
faith, formally and recently given. But to surrender Savoy was to
surrender a great deal more than so many square acres of land or so much
revenue. In its consequences, the surrender of Savoy was to make a
surrender to France of Switzerland and Italy, of both which countries
Savoy is the key,--as it is known to ordinary speculators in politics,
though it may not be known to the weavers in Norwich, who, it seems, are
by Mr. Fox called to be the judges in this matter.

A sure way, indeed, to encourage France not to make a surrender of this
key of Italy and Switzerland, or of Mentz, the key of Germany, or of any
other object whatsoever which she holds, is to let her see _that the
people of England raise a clamor against the war before terms are so
much as proposed on any side_. From that moment the Jacobins would be
masters of the terms. They would know that Parliament, at all hazards,
would force the king to a separate peace. The crown could not, in that
case, have any use of its judgment. Parliament could not possess more
judgment than the crown, when besieged (as Mr. Fox proposed to Mr.
Gurney) by the cries of the manufacturers. This description of men Mr.
Fox endeavored in his speech by every method to irritate and inflame. In
effect, his two speeches were, through the whole, nothing more than an
amplification of the Norwich handbill. He rested the greatest part of
his argument on the distress of trade, which he attributed to the war;
though it was obvious to any tolerably good observation, and, much more,
must have been clear to such an observation as his, that the then
difficulties of the trade and manufacture could have no sort of
connection with our share in it. The war had hardly begun. We had
suffered neither by spoil, nor by defeat, nor by disgrace of any kind.
Public credit was so little impaired, that, instead of being supported
by any extraordinary aids from individuals, it advanced a credit to
individuals to the amoun