his followers. It was inevitable that he should have
been recalled to office--and actually within one hundred hours of the
first news of the outbreak the Court sent for him urgently and
ungraciously.
From the 14th October, 1911, when he was appointed by Imperial Edict
Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan and ordered to proceed at once to the front
to quell the insurrection, until the 1st November, when he was given
virtually Supreme Power as President of the Grand Council in place of
Prince Ching, a whole volume is required to discuss adequately the maze
of questions involved. For the purposes of this account, however, the
matter can be dismissed very briefly in this way. Welcoming the
opportunity which had at last come and determined once for all to settle
matters decisively, so far as he was personally concerned, Yuan Shih-kai
deliberately followed the policy of holding back and delaying everything
until the very incapacity marking both sides--the Revolutionists quite
as much as the Manchus--forced him, as man of action and man of
diplomacy, to be acclaimed the sole mediator and saviour of the nation.
The detailed course of the Revolution, and the peculiar manner in which
Yuan Shih-kai allowed events rather than men to assert their mastery has
often been related and need not long detain us. It is generally conceded
that in spite of the bravery of the raw revolutionary levies, their
capacity was entirely unequal to the trump card Yuan Shih-kai held all
the while in his hand--the six fully-equipped Divisions of Field Troops
he himself had organized as Tientsin Viceroy. It was a portion of this
field-force which captured and destroyed the chief revolutionary base in
the triple city of Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang in November, 1911, and
which he held back just as it was about to give the _coup de grace_ by
crossing the river in force and sweeping the last remnants of the
revolutionary army to perdition. Thus it is correct to declare that had
he so wished Yuan Shih-kai could have crushed the revolution entirely
before the end of 1911; but he was sufficiently astute to see that the
problem he had to solve was not merely military but moral as well. The
Chinese as a nation were suffering from a grave complaint. Their
civilization had been made almost bankrupt owing to unresisted foreign
aggression and to the native inability to cope with the mass of
accumulated wrongs which a superimposed and exhausted feudalism--the
Manchu system--
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