forget that an equal meed of praise
belongs to those without whom neither blow could have been struck. The
Congressmen who voted years in advance the money to lay down the ships,
to build the guns, to buy the armor-plate; the Department officials and
the business men and wage-workers who furnished what the Congress had
authorized; the Secretaries of the Navy who asked for and expended the
appropriations; and finally the officers who, in fair weather and foul,
on actual sea service, trained and disciplined the crews of the ships
when there was no war in sight--all are entitled to a full share in the
glory of Manila and Santiago, and the respect accorded by every true
American to those who wrought such signal triumph for our country.
It was forethought and preparation which secured us the overwhelming
triumph of 1898. If we fail to show forethought and preparation now,
there may come a time when disaster will befall us instead of triumph;
and should this time come, the fault will rest primarily, not upon those
whom the accident of events puts in supreme command at the moment, but
upon those who have failed to prepare in advance.

There should be no cessation in the work of completing our Navy. So far
ingenuity has been wholly unable to devise a substitute for the great
war craft whose hammering guns beat out the mastery of the high seas.
It is unsafe and unwise not to provide this year for several additional
battle ships and heavy armored cruisers, with auxiliary and lighter
craft in proportion; for the exact numbers and character I refer you to
the report of the Secretary of the Navy. But there is something we need
even more than additional ships, and this is additional officers and
men. To provide battle ships and cruisers and then lay them up, with the
expectation of leaving them unmanned until they are needed in actual
war, would be worse than folly; it would be a crime against the Nation.

To send any war ship against a competent enemy unless those aboard it
have been trained by years of actual sea service, including incessant
gunnery practice, would be to invite not merely disaster, but the
bitterest shame and humiliation. Four thousand additional seamen and one
thousand additional marines should be provided; and an increase in the
officers should be provided by making a large addition to the classes
at Annapolis. There is one small matter which should be mentioned in
connection with Annapolis. The pretentious and u