the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came
back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I would
not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle,
incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for
my removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple
removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont,
Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took no
steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I
understood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has his
superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility
every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to
change his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that as
the main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of ever having any
large command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had the
vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to my
staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military
education whatever, I said that I would give anything if I were
commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I
believed I could do some good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested
that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry.
I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned
this superstition.

In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making his
selections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my
doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained it
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all