mind earlier, for on the 3d of
December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south
of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg.
On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena
troops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them and
the Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus
secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same day,
the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the country
south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at Memphis by
the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I sent Sherman with two
divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked
whether I should command the expedition down the river myself or send
Sherman. I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment
of the great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire
to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct
supervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was his
senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War to
exercise that particular command,--and independently. I doubted
McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in
forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose
authority to command was above both him and me.

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between us
or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going
further south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was the
main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the
defence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. I
hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held the
better.

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that our
movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held away
from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected
to abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha. With that point as a
secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo
until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was
contemplated.

It was my intention, and so understood by S