ortie had been made at any
time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been
quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's
main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to
drive our troops away.

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of
March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall
surrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of
both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with
General Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.
On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's
army. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of
artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into
the hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side during
the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.

CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT AND
TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had
been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed
that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very
small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an
enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of
largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line of
march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily
defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz
to the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa and
Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the
great plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range of
mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as
possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually
visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not
acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, was
arriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough to
supply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above
the fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and an
army of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for an
indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the