living or of obtaining peace? (11)

(11) Cf. "Econ." v. 7.

Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a
superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear
of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between
a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.

There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some
generals, (12) in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior
to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force, (13)
so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury
they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose
superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their
force into action.

(12) Or, "one knows of generals," e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.
Cf. "Hell." VI. v. 51.

(13) Lit. "an absolutely weak force."

Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a
prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your
command; excess of victory (14) never yet caused any conqueror one pang
of remorse.

(14) Or, "a great and decided victory." Cf. "Hiero," ii. 16.

But in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that,
do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say I,
under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force
into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the
troops at your command, both horses and men. A body of that size and
quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater
security. Whereas, if a general brings all his troops into action
against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things
must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured,
others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a
third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is
impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would
desire. If for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there
will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual
entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape
offhand, (15) especially if you have invention to create a scare in the
minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of
action. (16) For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use.

(15) Or, "by themselves," reading {ex auto