hundred and fifty-one, at Boston, in
said District, one Charles G. Davis, with force and arms, did aid, abet
and assist one Shadrach, otherwise called Frederic, otherwise called
Frederic Wilkins, the same being then and there a person owing service
or labor to escape from Charles Devens, junior, Marshal of the United
States, for said District of Massachusetts, who was then and there, a
person legally authorized to arrest said fugitive, and said fugitive
being then and there arrested pursuant to the authority given and
declared in a certain statute of the United States, approved on the
eighteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and fifty.

Mr. Davis thereupon repeated his plea of not guilty.

* * * * *

[Note. Upon the previous examination of Mr. Wright, Mr. Lunt for the
United States, had opened his case by stating that the complaint was
based upon the 7th section of the act of September 18, 1850, (See
Appendix), making it punishable by fine and imprisonment, to aid, abet,
or assist, in the escape of a fugitive slave; and he should therefore
call witnesses to show that the Shadrach named in the complaint against
Wright, was a fugitive, as therein alleged. (See complaint). Mr. Lunt
proceeded to call several witnesses, among whom Seth J. Thomas, and John
Caphart, were named. Mr. Caphart did not appear.

Commissioner Hallett called the attention of the District Attorney to
the Statute, and said he was clearly of the opinion, and should rule,
that, if it should appear that Shadrach was an _alleged fugitive_, an
attempt to rescue him would be an offence under the act.

Mr. Sewall, counsel for Mr. Wright, protested against the ruling.

Colonel Seth J. Thomas was called to the stand. Mr. Thomas was called
upon to read the Norfolk documents, before exhibited to Commissioner
Curtis, tending to show that Shadrach was a fugitive.

Mr. Sewall objected, that the documents could not be used as evidence in
this case. They could only be used, if at all, upon a complaint, under
the act, for the arrest and delivery of an alleged fugitive. They had
not yet been received as evidence in such a case; they were only
admitted subject to future objections, and the proceedings had been
indefinitely postponed. There was no provision of the statute, and no
principle of law which would make them evidence in criminal proceedings
against a stranger, a free man, charged with m