ought
probable. Meanwhile at Kimberley, although the reports of the officer
in command of the garrison did not appear to Sir Redvers to show any
immediate anxiety, yet the successful defence of that place depended
on other than the regular troops,[138] and there were indications that
the strain of the situation was being already felt. Urgent appeals
were addressed by the civil community to the High Commissioner,
drawing his attention to the large number of women and children
within the town, the possibility of the cattle, on which the meat
supplies of the invested population mainly depended, being captured by
the enemy, and the difficulty of maintaining order amongst the 10,000
"raw savages" employed in the mine compounds.

[Footnote 136: See Sir R. Buller's despatch to Secretary of
State for War, dated 1st November, 1899.]

[Footnote 137: Before leaving England Sir R. Buller had
informed the War Office that he proposed to disembark the 1st
(Methuen's) division at Cape Town, the 2nd (Clery's) at Port
Elizabeth, and the 3rd (Gatacre's) at East London; but,
having regard to possible changes in the strategic situation,
he requested that every ship should call at Cape Town for
orders.]

[Footnote 138: See Vol. II.]

[Sidenote: Difficulties to be dealt with.]

The consideration of these reports and representations made it evident
that the whole situation had changed from that contemplated when the
original plan of campaign had been drawn up. For an aggressive advance
on Bloemfontein there was as yet no adequate army. The component parts
of it were on the high seas. Even after they should have arrived, much
time and labour would be required, before they could be welded
together, and supplied with all that was needed for an offensive march
into a country so distant from the coast. On the other hand, if
Ladysmith should meanwhile fall, the Boer commandos at present
surrounding that town would be set free to seize not only Maritzburg
but probably also the seaport of Durban, the possession of which would
give to the republics direct access to the outer world, and would, as
was believed by both Boer and British, be a signal to all the
disaffected in Cape Colony to take up arms. In the western theatre of
war, the early relief of Kimberley was an object dear to the hearts of
all loyalists, and its loss would undoubtedly give an immediate