measures in 1917, and our
programme for the following winter contemplated a proportion of two
fighting squadrons to each Corps Squadron. By 1917 there were five
British Armies in France and Belgium and our air forces were increased
to provide a Brigade for each of the two new Armies. The Headquarters
of the flying force in the field (except in the case of the Independent
Air Force, which was responsible to the Supreme War Council and the Air
Ministry in London) remained attached to G.H.Q. throughout the war.

The main difficulty in the higher organization was the lack of
co-operation between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air
Service and their competition for the supply of men and machines--the
demands of both being urgent and insatiable. As a first step to overcome
this, an Air Board was formed in May, 1916, to discuss general air
policy, especially the combined operation of the Naval and Military Air
Services, to make recommendations on the types of machines required by
each, and to co-ordinate the supply of material. The Air Board was an
improvement, but not a remedy, and, therefore, in 1917 it was decided to
form an Air Ministry responsible for war aviation in all its branches
and to amalgamate the Naval and Military Air Services as the Royal Air
Force. This was carried into effect early in 1918, with Lord Rothermere
as Secretary of State for Air with a seat in the Cabinet, and the air
became the third service of the Crown, with an independent Government
department permeated with a knowledge of air navigation, machinery, and
weather, and closely allied to the industrial world for the initiation,
guidance, and active supervision of research and experimental work.

I will mention later some of the many arguments for and against the
retention of an independent Air Ministry and autonomous Air Force in
peace. The amalgamation was certainly advantageous in war. It effected
the correlation of a number of hitherto independent services according
to a uniform policy and prevented overlapping by centralizing
administration. Under single control it was possible to carry out, on a
carefully co-ordinated plan, recruiting and training, to supply men and
material, to organize air power according to the strategic situation in
each of the various theatres of war, and to form the correct ratio
between the air forces in the field and the reserves in training at
home. The difficulty was that the amalgamation had to be carrie