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no country is likely for some time to possess sufficiently large air forces to obtain a decisive victory, or at any rate an uncontested superiority, at the outbreak of war. Though in air, as in every other form of warfare, attack is more effective than defence, we cannot afford to keep our air forces up to war strength in peace any more than our Army or Navy. The problem, from a military point of view, is therefore to ensure an adequate reserve and to maintain our capacity for expansion to meet emergencies. The number of units maintained at war establishment should be the absolute minimum for safety and of the type immediately required on mobilization, i.e. long-range bombing and naval reconnaissance squadrons. The remainder should be in cadre form. We can, of course, maintain a fixed number of machines and pilots in reserve for every one on the active list, but, although some such system is necessary, on a large scale it is open to many and serious objections. First of all, even on a cadre basis, it means keeping inactive at considerable cost a number of machines which may never be used and which, however carefully stored, quickly deteriorate. Knowledge of aeronautics is still slender and improvements are made so continuously that machines may become obsolete within a few months. Moreover, the growth of service aviation in peace must tend to become artificial and conventional rather than natural, and this will react on design and construction, which will be cramped, both technically and financially, within the limits imposed by service requirements. It is obvious therefore that the capacity of the construction industry to expand cannot be fostered by service aviation alone; furthermore, in the event of another war of attrition, expansion will be more essential than any amount of machine reserve power immediately available, and in the event of a war of short duration that power will win which has the greatest preponderance of machines, service or civil, fit to take the air. The asphyxiation of a large enemy city, if within range, can be done by night-flying commercial machines, and it would require a defending force of great numerical superiority for its successful defence. Whether, therefore, from this point of view, or others, which I will mention later, another solution must be found, and this lies in the development of civil aviation. An analogy in the Navy and the Mercantile Marine has long been apparent. "Se
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