the malady of the
modern world; this is his revolutionary scheme for the establishment of
society on such a basis as would conduce to progress. It involves, as
may be seen, the disavowal of the belief in God and king; the
substitution of a republic for a monarchy, and of humanity for God.
Comte conceived religion as the concentration of the three great
altruistic affections, namely, of _reverence_ towards that which is
above us; of _love_ towards that which helps and sustains us, and
_benevolence_ towards that which needs our co-operation. Religion
being in his judgment a supreme concern of life, though always
subordinated to the larger interest of social welfare, he was anxious
to provide the new commonwealth with an idealism which should set
before man a Being able to evoke these three great emotions. Formerly
man had bestowed them on God; Comte thought he had found a more
excellent way in suggesting that they might far more appropriately and
profitably be exercised on mankind. The service of God, therefore,
being changed into the service of man, he contended that the course of
things would set steadily in a higher direction, because all the
immense energy and enthusiasm which the worship of God had been able to
provoke in the past would be available in the cause of suffering,
down-trodden and persecuted humanity. He wished to dam the stream of
devotion flowing towards the churches and God, and divert it into
channels that had far greater need of it--the unsatisfied and
unprovided needs of all mankind.

Is it urged that religion apart from a belief in God is an
impossibility? Doubtless such is the conviction of great numbers of
people, and, it must be confessed, such usage of the word is not
consonant with prevalent custom. Still the emotion which Comte
experienced for Humanity was such as no other word would adequately
express. As Mr. Mill remarks in his chapters on the Positivist System
(p. 133)--

It has been said that whoever believes in the infinite nature of duty,
even if he believe in nothing else, is religious. Comte believes in
what is meant by the infinite nature of duty, but he refers the
obligations of duty, as well as all sentiments of devotion, to a
concrete object, at once ideal and real; the human race, conceived as a
continuous whole, including the past, the present and the future. . . .
Candid persons of all creeds may be willing to admit that if a person
has an ideal object, his attach