e has been a strong political pressure of outsiders to get
certain parties put in command of new Dep'ts to be made out of the
old Dep't of the Miss. The presence of the enemy and the danger
of the capital have for the moment suspended these political
intrigues, or rather prevented the accomplishment of their objects.
If any one of our Western Gen'ls would do something creditable and
brilliant in the present crisis, it would open the way to a new
organization such as it should be.

"From the position of St. Louis as the source of supplies, Missouri
ought not to be separated from Arkansas and western Tennessee.
What will be done in the matter I do not know.

"Yours truly,
"H. W. Halleck."

None of "our Western generals" had then done anything very "creditable
and brilliant." Even Grant was the object of grave charges and
bitter attacks. Powerful influences were at work to supersede him
in command of the army in west Tennessee. Had there been any
available general at that time capable of commanding public
confidence, the military idea would doubtless have prevailed, but
in the absence of such a leader the politicians triumphed in part.

IN COMMAND OF THE "ARMY OF THE FRONTIER"

The old department, called Department of the Mississippi, was
divided, and Major-General Samuel R. Curtis was assigned to command
the new Department of the Missouri, composed of the territory west
of the Mississippi River. For some months the radicals had it all
their own way, and military confiscation was carried on without
hindrance.

When this change occurred I was in the field in immediate command
of the forces which I had assembled there for aggressive operations,
and which General Curtis named the "Army of the Frontier." My
official report of December 7, 1862, gave a full account of the
operations of that army up to November 20, when sickness compelled
me to relinquish the command.

As will be seen from that report and from my correspondence with
General Curtis at that time, it was then well known that the enemy
was concentrating in the Arkansas valley all the troops he could
raise, and making preparations to return across the Boston Mountains
and "dispute with us the possession of northwestern Arkansas and
southwestern Missouri"; and I had placed my troops where they could
live to a great extent on the country, and quickly concentrate to
meet the enemy when he should advance. But General