erms as at once the best
vehicle for the conveyance of their thoughts and for accession to
popularity. It has its opponents in Hamann, Jacobi, Reimarus, Tiedemann,
and others; yet he is a bold spirit who dares to attack this object of
universal favor. But the opposition is insufficient, and the _Critique
of Pure Reason_ is too strong for these hastily-conceived rejoinders.
Every department of inquiry is powerfully affected by it. Religion,
logic, metaphysics, law, psychology, aesthetics, and education are alike
molded by its plastic touch. Holland and all the north of Europe are
vocal with its praises.

And now we may ask, why such favor shown toward this new apparition? Let
us delay a moment and examine the hard-wrought thoughts of this
bachelor-son of an obscure saddler. Kant had been profoundly disgusted
with the want of harmony in philosophical speculations. The
disagreements that he saw in his own time were but the continuation of
what, he had learned from history, was the fact in the days of the
heathen sages. Following close upon the footsteps of Hume, he asked:
"How far can human reason go? Where is its limit?" His _Critique_ was
the answer. He showed that, if the loose methods of thought were to be
continued, philosophy, instead of being the hand-maid of religion, would
be unworthy the attention of the most unlettered man. Hence he would
recall reason from its lofty flights, and direct its attention solely to
self-consciousness. Only by studying the powers of the mind as a datum,
he held, can any positive results be gained. Using his own illustration
of his work, he would do for philosophy what Copernicus had done for
astronomy--reverse metaphysics by referring classes of ideas to inner,
which before had been referred to outer, causes. He granted that, for
some things, man's reason is sufficient. The existence of God, the
doctrine of original sin, and the soul's immortality need no Scripture
to reveal them. They are intuitive subjects of knowledge. But these
truths are extremely limited; man needs what nature has not given him.
Kant's distinction between practical and speculative reason was in favor
of the former, since its aim was wisdom. But speculative reason is often
exerted for its own gratification. Hence its results are frequently
useless and ephemeral. His grand conclusion is, that no object can be
known to us except in proportion as it is apprehended by our
perceptions, and definable by our faculties o