elligence which was,
unfortunately, too true, were in several respects erroneous. They placed
matters in a gloomy aspect, which was not justified by the facts. The
battle of Chillianwallah, however doubtful as a victory, and however
disastrous as to the loss which we experienced, neither perilled the
existence of British rule in India, nor shook the hold of the English
upon the Punjaub. The arrival of the despatches, and the issue of an
extraordinary gazette, in some measure reassured the public; and as Lord
Gough was decidedly and deservedly a favourite, people became anxious
that before Sir Charles Napier should arrive out and take the command of
the army, his lordship might be enabled to revenge Chillianwallah by a
well-fought battle and decided victory. The friends of Lord Gough even
entertained the hope that he might conclude the campaign by the entire
dispersion of the Sikh army, and the reconquest of the Punjaub. It was
very generally felt that the ministry, whatever their private feeling
and private intentions, had shown too much eagerness to disclaim him,
and to signify, by making their only measure for the emergency in India
the appointment of a new commander-in-chief, that they supposed the
blame of any misfortunes there to have been exclusively with Lord Gough.
Military men pointed out that the previous policy of Lord Hardinge,
and the immediate policy of Lord Dalhousie, both as it regarded their
military and political management, invited the resistance to our power
which had been awakened. The chief apprehensions entertained arose
from the course which Gholab Singh and Dost Mohammed might pursue. The
former, with his Sikh soldiery, occupied positions that kindled some
suspicion of his intentions, while he had, as an ostensible ally,
omitted to strike a single blow in our favour. He had collected, it was
alleged, one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; and he was represented
as having declared that his control over his own soldiers was imperfect,
and that their sympathy was wholly with the troops of Chuttur and Shere
Singh. As it was not uncommon for the native princes, when hesitating
between the British and their enemies, to represent their soldiers as
untrustworthy and dangerous to themselves, Gholab's account of himself,
his province, and his army, caused him reasonably to be suspected.
Dost Mohammed rendered substantial aid to Shere Singh; at least twelve
thousand Affghans were encamped under the command