and instinctive is the conviction of the importance of
this new element in naval force.

* * * * *

The considerations to which we have alluded have already received a large
share of the public attention. They have been examined and discussed from
almost every possible point of view. Probably every one has some ideas,
more or less correct, concerning them. But there is a consideration which
is equally important, which has received very little attention in this
country, which indeed seems to have been entirely overlooked. It is this:
The degree to which naval efficiency is dependent upon a wise colonial
system.

If the only work of a fleet were to defend one's own harbors, then
colonies, whatever might be their commercial importance, as an arm of
naval strength, would be of but little value. If all the use England had
for her navy were to defend London and Liverpool, she would do well to
abandon many of her distant strongholds, which have been won at such cost,
and which are kept with such care. If all our ships had to do were to keep
the enemy out of Boston harbor and New York bay, it would not matter much,
if every friendly port fifty miles from our own borders were closed
against us. But the protection of our own ports is not by any means the
chief work of fleets. The protection of commerce is as vital a duty.
Commerce is the life-blood of a nation. Destroy that, and you destroy what
makes and mans your fleets. Destroy that, and you destroy what supports
the people and the government which is over the people. But if commerce is
to be protected, war-ships must not hug timidly the shore. They must put
boldly out to sea, and be wherever commerce is. They must range the stormy
Atlantic. They must ply to and fro over that primitive home of commerce,
the Mediterranean. Doubling the Cape, they must visit every part of the
affluent East and of the broad Pacific. With restless energy they must
plough every sea and explore every water where the hope of honest gain may
entice the busy merchantman.

See what new and trying conditions are imposed upon naval power. A ship,
however stanch, has her points of positive weakness. She can carry only a
limited supply either of stores or of ammunition. She is liable, like
everything else of human construction, to accidents of too serious a
nature to be repaired on ship-board. If, now, from any reason, from
disasters of storm or sea, or from deficient provi