e, Patterson should bear none of the blame of the Bull Run disaster,
if he could have done nothing to avoid it; but we have shown that he
could have done what was necessary, and that there were reasons existing
at the time for taking such a course, of which he should have been
cognizant.

The army left Martinsburg for the south, as we have seen, on Monday,
July 15th. The whole division, with trifling exceptions, moved forward,
and advanced on that day as far as 'Bunker Hill,' ten miles from
Martinsburg. An insignificant rebel force fell back as Patterson
advanced, and at 'Bunker Hill' the army encamped around the smoking
brands of the rebel camp-fires, just deserted. Here was a small
post-town called Mill Creek; and near by, the high ridge called 'Bunker
Hill' formed another fine natural position for defence; but the rebels
were not disposed to defend it. Patterson lay here two days, within
twelve miles of the rebel strong-hold at Winchester, the pickets of the
two armies watching each other by night and day. On the 17th the Federal
army was astir before daylight, and an advance to the south was
commenced. But before the rear-guard filed down from 'Bunker Hill' to
the turnpike, a counter-march was ordered; and the whole division
proceeded twelve miles to the east, leaving Winchester on their flank,
and occupying Charlestown, in Jefferson County. What could have pleased
Johnston better? What wonder that he should take the opportunity, as
soon as satisfied that this flank movement was not intended to operate
against him, to leave his fortifications at Winchester in charge of a
small force, and rush to reinforce Beauregard? And is it not more than
remarkable that Patterson, after occupying Charlestown for four days,
should fall back to Harper's Ferry on the very day when his foe had
effected his _ruse de guerre_, and was actually turning the tide of
battle at Bull Run?

There is nothing in all this to change the opinion, previously formed,
that Patterson should have pushed on to Winchester early in July. The
whole of Johnston's manoeuvering seems to have been calculated merely to
deceive Patterson, and to gain time. And so clever was he in his
strategy, that, when his march to Manassas commenced, Patterson,
learning either of the main movement or of a feint towards himself,
aroused his army at midnight, and held them in readiness to fight, in
apprehension of instant attack. As early as the middle of June, when
Patterson