ferent leaders cheered on their troops by a few last
words as they went into the fight; being especially careful to warn them
how to deal with the British bayonet charges. Campbell had visited each
separate band, again requesting every man who felt like flinching not to
go into the battle. He bade them hold on to every inch of ground as long
as possible, and when forced back to rally and return at once to the
fight. Cleavland gave much the same advice; telling his men that when
once engaged they were not to wait for the word of command, but to do as
he did, for he would show them by his example how to fight, and they
must then act as their own officers. The men were to fire quickly, and
stand their ground as long as possible, if necessary sheltering
themselves behind trees. If they could do no better they were to
retreat, but not to run quite off; but to return and renew the struggle,
for they might have better luck at the next attempt. [Footnote: Ramsay
("Revolution in South Carolina"), writing in 1785, gives the speech
verbatim, apparently from Cleavland himself. It is very improbable that
it is verbally correct, but doubtless it represents the spirit of his
remarks.]

So rapid were the movements of the Americans, and so unexpected the
attack, that a loyalist officer, who had been out reconnoitring, had
just brought word to the British commander that there was no sign of
danger, when the first shots were heard; and by the time the officer had
paraded and posted his men, the assault had begun, his horse had been
killed, and he himself wounded. [Footnote: "Essays in Military
Biography," Col. Charles Cornwallis Chesney, London, 1874. On p. 323
begins a memoir of "A Carolina Loyalist in the Revolutionary War." It is
written by the loyalist himself, who was presumably a relation of Col.
Chesney's. It was evidently written after the event, and there are some
lapses. Thus he makes the war with the Cherokees take place in 1777,
instead of '76. His explanation of Tarleton's defeat at the Cowpens must
be accepted with much reserve. At King's Mountain he says the Americans
had fifteen hundred men, instead of twenty-five hundred, of which
Allaire speaks. Allaire probably consciously exaggerated the number.]

When Ferguson learned that his foes were on him, he sprang on his horse,
his drums beat to arms, and he instantly made ready for the fight.
Though surprised by the unexpected approach of the American, he exerted
himself with