e stupendous errors materially
shortened the war, though even if prolonged it could, in my opinion,
have had ultimately no other termination.
As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was the
acceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attaching
too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in
three battles Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte--all of which
were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along the
Belgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I am
glad to say, does not belong to him.
With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon's
army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans
practically the victors. The taking of Paris was but a sentiment
--the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces held
without molesting that city, and only the political influences
consequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace to
be deferred.
I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, either
on the march or in battle. The only time I saw any of it engaged was
in the unfortunate charge at Gravelotte. That proved its mettle good
and discipline fair, but answered no other purpose. Such of it as
was not attached to the infantry was organized in divisions, and
operated in accordance with the old idea of covering the front and
flanks of the army, a duty which it thoroughly performed. But thus
directed it was in no sense an independent corps, and hence cannot
be, said to have accomplished anything in the campaign, or have had a
weight or influence at all proportionate to its strength. The method
of its employment seemed to me a mistake, for, being numerically
superior to the French cavalry, had it been massed and manoeuvred
independently of the infantry, it could easily have broken up the
French communications, and done much other work of weighty influence
in the prosecution of the war.
The infantry was as fine as I ever saw, the men young and hardy in
appearance, and marching always with an elastic stride. The infantry
regiment, however, I thought too large--too many men for a colonel to
command unless he has the staff of a general--but this objection may
be counterbalanced by the advantages resulting from associating
together thus intimately the men from the same district, or county as
we would call it; the celerity of mobilization, and, in truth, the
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