nd now in his
frank, free way be plainly showed his light-heartedness and
gratification at success. That which for years his genius had been
planning and striving for--permanent unification of the German
States, had been accomplished by the war. It had welded them
together in a compact Empire which no power in Europe could disrupt,
and as such a union was the aim of Bismarck's life, he surely had a
right to feel jubilant.

Thanks to the courtesies extended me, I had been able to observe the
principal battles, and study many of the minor details of a war
between two of the greatest military nations of the world, and to
examine critically the methods followed abroad for subsisting,
equipping, and manoeuvring vast bodies of men during a stupendous,
campaign. Of course I found a great deal to interest and instruct
me, yet nowadays war is pretty much the same everywhere, and this one
offered no marked exception to my previous experiences. The methods
pursued on the march were the same as we would employ, with one most
important exception. Owing to the density of population throughout
France it was always practicable for the Germans to quarter their
troops in villages, requiring the inhabitants to subsist both
officers and men. Hence there was no necessity for camp and garrison
equipage, nor enormous provision trains, and the armies were
unencumbered by these impedimenta, indispensable when operating in a
poor and sparsely settled country. As I have said before, the only
trains were those for ammunition, pontoon-boats, and the field
telegraph, and all these were managed by special corps. If
transportation was needed for other purposes, it was obtained by
requisition from the invaded country, just as food and forage were
secured. Great celerity of combination was therefore possible, the
columns moving in compact order, and as all the roads were broad and
macadamized, there was little or nothing to delay or obstruct the
march of the Germans, except when their enemy offered resistance, but
even this was generally slight and not very frequent, for the French
were discouraged by disaster from the very outset of the campaign.

The earlier advantages gained by the Germans may be ascribed to the
strikingly prompt mobilization of their armies, one of the most
noticeable features of their perfect military system, devised by
almost autocratic power; their later successes were greatly aided by
the blunders of the French, whos