ls from the Horse Artillery, but the fire
from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. A
nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which
had been cleared. This was not at all satisfactory. The works were
evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our
army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no
battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in form, a much larger one would
be required than the army ever possessed. The great command of the
parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were
insurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading.

It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole _contour_ of
the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. The
engineers, with an escort, went round the works, approaching as near as
they could find cover. The garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot
and well regulated fire upon the officers whenever they were obliged to
show themselves. However, by keeping the Infantry beyond musket range,
and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed,
and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place
to drive off the reconnoitring party.

The fortifications were found equally strong, all round, the only
tangible point observed being the Cabul gateway, which offered the
following advantages for a _coup-de-main_. The road to the Gate was
clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions
for the Artillery within three hundred yards of the walls on both sides
of the road, and we had information that the Gateway was not built up, a
reinforcement from Cabul being expected.

The result of this reconnaisance was a report to His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack on
Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which
held out a prospect of success was a dash at the Cabul gateway, blowing
the gate open by bags of powder.

His Excellency decided upon the attempt, the camp was moved that evening
to the Cabul road, and the next morning, the 22nd, Sir John Keane in
person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan,
and gave orders for its execution. Preparations were made accordingly,
positions for the artillery were carefully examined, which excited the
jealousy of the garrison, who opened a smart fire upon the pa