wn to inspire the reader with confidence. As it
is, he must take it for granted that I was probably the only foreigner
whom Frenchmen had agreed not to consider an enemy in disguise.

While my relative was giving me the above resume, I was already aware
that there existed in the French War Office a scheme of mobilization and
a plan of campaign elaborated by Marshal Niel, the immediate predecessor
of Marshal Leboeuf. I knew, moreover, that this plan provided for the
formation of three armies, under the respective commands of Marshals
MacMahon, Bazaine, and Canrobert, and that the disposition of these
three armies had been the basis of negotiations for a Franco-Austrian
alliance which had been started six weeks previous to the declaration of
war by General Lebrun in Vienna. Up till the 22nd or 23rd of July the
preparations were carried out in accordance with that original project;
the respective staffs that had been appointed, the various regiments and
brigades distributed long ago, were already hurrying to the front, when
all of a sudden the whole of this plan was modified; the three armies
were to be fused into one, to be called "l'armee du Rhin," under the
sole and exclusive command of the Emperor.

Whence this sudden change? The historians, with their usual contempt for
small causes, have endeavoured to explain it in various ways. According
to some, the change was decided upon in order to afford the Emperor the
opportunity of distinguishing himself; the "armee du Rhin" was to revive
the glories of the "grande armee;" there was to be a second edition of
the Napoleonic epic. After the first startling successes, the Emperor
was to return to the capital, and Marshal Niel's plan was, if
practicable, to be taken up once more,--that is, the French troops,
having established a foothold in the enemy's country, were to be divided
again under so many Klebers, Soults, and Neys.

According to others, the Emperor, who until then had been living in a
fool's paradise with regard to the quantity, if not with regard to the
quality, of the forces at his disposal, suddenly had his eyes opened to
the real state of affairs. The six hundred and fifty thousand troops
supposed to be at his disposal had their existence mainly on paper: the
available reality did not amount to more than a third; _i. e._ to about
two hundred and fifteen thousand troops of all arms.

The facts advanced by these historians are true, but they did not
determine th