tham and our own time there has been an immense
advance in the scientific study of law, but it may be doubted whether
the problem of codification is at all nearer solution. Interest has
mainly been directed to the historical side of legal science, to the
phenomena of the evolution of laws as part of the development of
society, and from this point of view the question of remodelling the law
is one of minor interest. To Bentham the problem presented itself in the
simplest and most direct form possible. What he proposed to do was to
set forth a body of laws, clearly expressed, arranged in the order of
their logical connexion, exhibiting their own _rationale_ and excluding
all other law. On the other hand the problem has in some respects become
easier since the time of Bentham. With the Benthamite codification the
conception of reform in the substantive law is more or less mixed up. If
codification had been possible in his day, it would, unless it had been
accompanied by the searching reforms which have been effected since, and
mainly through his influence, perhaps have been more of an evil than a
good. The mere dread that, under the guise of codification or
improvement in form, some change in substance may secretly be effected
has long been a practical obstacle in the way of legal reform. But the
law has now been brought into a state of which it may be said that, if
it is not the best in all respects that might be desired, it is at least
in most respects as good as the conditions of legislation will permit it
to be. Codification, in fact, may now be treated purely as a question of
form. What is proposed is that the law, being, as we assume, in
substance what the nation wishes it to be, should be made as accessible
as possible, and as intelligible as possible. These two essential
conditions of a sound system of law are, we need hardly say, far from
being fulfilled in England. The law of the land is embodied in thousands
of statutes and tens of thousands of reports. It is expressed in
language which has never been fixed by a controlling authority, and
which has swayed about with every change of time, place and
circumstance. It has no definitions, no rational distinctions, no
connexion of parts. Until the passing of the Judicature Act of 1873 it
was pervaded throughout its entire sphere by the flagrant antinomy of
law and equity, and that act has only ordered, not executed, its
consolidation. No lawyer pretends to know more tha