he whole we use the words in a decidedly favourable sense, and imply
in it that generous warmth of impetuous, earnest feeling without which
few great things are done. This meaning of the word was not absolutely
unknown in the eighteenth century, and here and there a writer may be
found to vindicate its use as a term of praise rather than of reproach.
It might be applied to poetic[468] rapture with as little offence as
though a bard were extolled as fired by the muses or inspired by
Phoebus. But applied to graver topics, it was almost universally a term
of censure. The original derivation of the word was generally kept in
view. It is only within the last one or two generations that it has
altogether ceased to convey any distinct notion of a supernatural
presence--an afflatus from the Deity. But whereas the early Alexandrian
fathers who first borrowed the word from Plato and the ancient mysteries
had Christianised it and cordially adopted it in a favourable
signification, it was now employed in a hostile sense as 'a misconceit
of inspiration.'[469] It thus became a sort of byeword, applied in
opprobrium and derision to all who laid claim to a spiritual power or
divine guidance, such as appeared to the person by whom the term of
reproach was used, fanatical extravagance, or, at the least, an
unauthorised outstepping of all rightful bounds of reason. Its preciser
meaning differed exceedingly with the mind of the speaker and with the
opinions to which it was applied. It sometimes denoted the wildest and
most credulous fanaticism or the most visionary mysticism; on the other
hand, the irreligious, the lukewarm, and the formalist often levelled
the reproach of enthusiasm, equally with that of bigotry, at what ought
to have been regarded as sound spirituality, or true Christian zeal, or
the anxious efforts of thoughtful and religious men to find a surer
standing ground against the reasonings of infidels and Deists.

A word which has not only been strained by constant and reckless use in
religious contests, but is also vague in application and changeable in
meaning, might seem marked out for special avoidance. Yet it might be
difficult to find a more convenient expression under which to group
various forms of subjective, mystic, and emotional religion, which were
in some cases strongly antagonistic to one another, but were closely
allied in principle and agreed also in this, that they inevitably
brought upon their supporters the