He strewed not; of being offended with us for not doing
what He knows we cannot do.'[228] Tillotson always speaks guardedly on
the subject. He was keenly alive to the evil practical consequences
which may result from intellectual error,--very confident that in all
important particulars orthodox doctrine was the true and safe path, very
anxious therefore not to say anything which might weaken the sense of
responsibility in those who deviated from it. But he never attempted to
evade the logical conclusion which follows from an acknowledged right of
private judgment. In his practice as well as in his theory, he wholly
admitted the blamelessness of error where there was ardent sincerity of
purpose. He wrote several times against the Unitarians, but gladly
allowed that many of them were thoroughly good men, honest and candid in
argument,[229] nor did he even scruple to admit to a cordial friendship
one of their most distinguished leaders, Thomas Firmin, a man of great
beneficence and philanthropy.

There was no reservation in Tillotson's mind as to the general right of
private judgment. 'Any man that hath the spirit of a man must abhor to
submit to this slavery not to be allowed to examine his religion, and to
inquire freely into the grounds and reasons of it; and would break with
any Church in the world upon this single point; and would tell them
plainly, "If your religion be too good to be examined, I doubt it is too
bad to be believed."'[230] He grounded the right on three
principles.[231] The first was, that essentials are so plain that every
man of ordinary capacities, after receiving competent instruction, is
able to judge of them. This, he added, was no new doctrine of the
Reformation, but had been expressly owned by such ancient fathers as St.
Chrysostom and St. Augustine. The second was, that it was a Scriptural
injunction. St. Luke, in the Acts, St. Paul and St. John in their
Epistles, had specially commended search, examination, inquiry, proof.
The third was, that even those who most disputed the right were forced
nevertheless to grant it in effect. Whenever they make a proselyte they
argue with him, they appeal to his reason, they bid him to use his
judgment. If it were urged that it could not be accordant to the Divine
purpose to give full scope to a liberty which distracted unity and gave
rise to so much controversy and confusion,--we must judge, he replied,
by what is, not by what we fancy ought to be. We coul