s, 'believe what thou hearest in
Church?' 'Most part of it, Master,' returned the host. 'And dost not
thou then tremble at the thought of eternal punishment?' 'As for that,
Master,' said he, 'I never once thought about it; but what signifies
talking about matters so far off?'[269] But if by the majority the
doctrine in point was practically shelved, it was everywhere passively
accepted as the only orthodox faith, and all who ventured to question
it were at once set down as far advanced in ways of Deism or worse.

Nothing can be more confirmatory of what has been said than the writings
of Tillotson himself. His much-famed sermon 'On the Eternity of Hell
Torments' was preached in 1690 before Queen Mary, a circumstance which
gave occasion to some of the bitterest of his ecclesiastical and
political opponents to pretend that it was meant to assuage the horrors
of remorse felt by the Queen for having unnaturally deserted her
father.[270] His departure, however, from what was considered the
orthodox belief was cautious in the extreme. He acknowledged indeed that
the words translated by eternal and 'everlasting' do not always, in
Scripture language, mean unending. But on this he laid no stress. He did
not doubt, he said, that this at all events was their meaning wherever
they occurred in the passages in question. He mentioned, only to set
aside the objection raised by Locke and others, that death could not
mean eternal life in misery.[271] He thought the solemn assertion
applied typically to the Israelites, and confirmed (to show its
immutability) by an oath that they should not 'enter into his rest,'
entirely precluded Origen's idea of a final restitution.[272] He even
supposed, although somewhat dubiously, that 'whenever we break the laws
of God we fall into his hands and lie at his mercy, and he may, without
injustice, inflict what punishment on us he pleases,'[273] and that in
any case obstinately impenitent sinners must expect his threatenings to
be fully executed upon them. But in this lay the turning-point of his
argument. 'After all, he that threatens hath still the power of
execution in his hand. For there is this remarkable difference between
promises and threatenings--that he who promiseth passeth over a right to
another, and thereby stands obliged to him in justice and faithfulness
to make good his promise; and if he do not, the party to whom the
promise is made is not only disappointed, but injuriously dealt withal