niverse. It is by means or upon
occasion of a body He has set in motion that He moves another. It
is He who created everything and who does everything in His
creatures or works. Now, volition is the modification of the will
or willing faculty of the soul, just as motion is the modification
of bodies. Shall we affirm that God is the real, immediate, and
total cause of the motion of all bodies, and that He is not equally
the real and immediate cause of the good-will of men's wills? Will
this modification, the most excellent of all, be the only one not
made by God in His own work, and which the work bestows on itself
independently? Who can entertain such a thought? Therefore my
good-will which I had not yesterday and which I have to-day is not a
thing I bestow upon myself, but must come from Him who gave me both
the will and the being.

As to will is a greater perfection than barely to be, so to will
good is more perfect than to will. The step from power to a
virtuous act is the greatest perfection in man. Power is only a
balance or poise between virtue and vice, or a suspension between
good and evil. The passage or step to the act is a decision or
determination for the good, and consequent by the superior good.
The power susceptible of good and evil comes from God, which we have
fully evinced. Now, shall we affirm that the decisive stroke that
determines to the greater good either is not at all, or is less
owing to Him? All this evidently proves what the Apostle says,
viz., that God "works both to will and to do of His good pleasure."
Here is man's dependence; let us look for his liberty.

SECT. LXVI. Of Man's Liberty.

I am free, nor can I doubt of it. I am intimately and invincibly
convinced that I can either will or not will, and that there is in
me a choice not only between willing and not willing, but also
between divers wills about the variety of objects that present
themselves. I am sensible, as the Scripture says, that I "am in the
hands of my Council," which alone suffices to show me that my soul
is not corporeal. All that is body or corporeal does not in the
least determine itself, and is, on the contrary, determined in all
things by laws called physical, which are necessary, invincible, and
contrary to what I call liberty. From thence I infer that my soul
is of a nature entirely different from that of my body. Now who is
it that was able to join by a reciprocal union two such differen