he motion by which a
body is moved is the same as the volition by which the willing
faculty wills. If therefore volition be necessitated as motion it
deserves neither more nor less praise or blame. For though a
necessitated will may seem to be a will unconstrained, yet it is
such a will as one cannot forbear having, and for which he that has
it is not accountable. Nor does previous knowledge establish true
liberty, for a will may be preceded by the knowledge of divers
objects, and yet have no real election or choice. Nor is
deliberation or the being in suspense any more than a vain trifle,
if I deliberate between two counsels when I am under an actual
impotency to follow the one and under an actual necessity to pursue
the other. In short, there is no serious and true choice between
two objects, unless they be both actually ready within my reach so
that I may either leave or take which of the two I please.

SECT. LXVIII. Will may Resist Grace, and Its Liberty is the
Foundation of Merit and Demerit.

When therefore I say I am free, I mean that my will is fully in my
power, and that even God Himself leaves me at liberty to turn it
which way I please, that I am not determined as other beings, and
that I determine myself. I conceive that if that First Being
prevents me, to inspire me with a good-will, it is still in my power
to reject His actual inspiration, how strong soever it may be, to
frustrate its effect, and to refuse my assent to it. I conceive
likewise that when I reject His inspiration for the good, I have the
true and actual power not to reject it; just as I have the actual
and immediate power to rise when I remain sitting, and to shut my
eyes when I have them open. Objects may indeed solicit me by all
their allurements and agreeableness to will or desire them. The
reasons for willing may present themselves to me with all their most
lively and affecting attendants, and the Supreme Being may also
attract me by His most persuasive inspirations. But yet for all
this actual attraction of objects, cogency of reasons, and even
inspiration of a Superior Being, I still remain master of my will,
and am free either to will or not to will.

It is this exemption not only from all manner of constraint or
compulsion but also from all necessity and this command over my own
actions that render me inexcusable when I will evil, and
praiseworthy when I will good; in this lies merit and demerit,
praise and blame;