e of our principal ports has
brought to light a defalcation of the gravest character, the particulars
of which will be laid before you in a special report from the Secretary
of the Treasury. By his report and the accompanying documents it will
be seen that the weekly returns of the defaulting officer apparently
exhibited throughout a faithful administration of the affairs intrusted
to his management. It, however, now appears that he commenced
abstracting the public moneys shortly after his appointment and
continued to do so, progressively increasing the amount, for the term
of more than seven years, embracing a portion of the period during which
the public moneys were deposited in the Bank of the United States, the
whole of that of the State bank deposit system, and concluding only on
his retirement from office, after that system had substantially failed
in consequence of the suspension of specie payments.

The way in which this defalcation was so long concealed and the steps
taken to indemnify the United States, as far as practicable, against
loss will also be presented to you. The case is one which imperatively
claims the attention of Congress and furnishes the strongest motive
for the establishment of a more severe and secure system for the
safe-keeping and disbursement of the public moneys than any that has
heretofore existed.

It seems proper, at all events, that by an early enactment similar to
that of other countries the application of public money by an officer
of Government to private uses should be made a felony and visited with
severe and ignominious punishment. This is already in effect the law
in respect to the Mint, and has been productive of the most salutary
results. Whatever system is adopted, such an enactment would be wise as
an independent measure, since much of the public moneys must in their
collection and ultimate disbursement pass twice through the hands of
public officers, in whatever manner they are intermediately kept.
The Government, it must be admitted, has been from its commencement
comparatively fortunate in this respect. But the appointing power can
not always be well advised in its selections, and the experience of
every country has shown that public officers are not at all times proof
against temptation. It is a duty, therefore, which the Government
owes, as well to the interests committed to its care as to the officers
themselves, to provide every guard against transgressions of this