news of
the progress of the German harbour works begun in the winter at
Stamboul, and himself learned that the railway bridge which the Turks
proposed to build over the Bosporus was not to be proceeded with, for
the German high command had superseded that scheme by their own idea of
making a tunnel under the Bosporus instead, which would be safer from
aircraft.

Such up-to-date, though in brief outline, is the history of the
establishment of the Prussian octopus grip on military and naval matters
in Turkey. We have largely ourselves to blame for it. Upon that pathetic
and lamb-like record of our diplomacy during the months between the
outbreak of the European War, and the entry of Turkey into it in October
1914, it would be morbid to dwell at any length, though a short summary
is necessary. As we all know now, Turkey had concluded a treaty with
Germany early in August, and when our Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir
Louis Malet, who was on leave in England at that date, returned to his
post on August 16th, all that Turkey wanted was to gain time in which to
effect her mobilisation. This she did, with complete success, and our
Ambassador telegraphed to England stating his perfect confidence in the
sincerity with which the Grand Vizier professed his friendship for
England. All through those weeks of August and September this confidence
appeared to continue unabated. The Moderate party in Turkey--that is to
say, the hoodwinking party--were reported to be daily gaining strength,
and it was most important that the Allies should give them every
assistance, and above all not precipitate matters. All was going well:
all we had to do was to wait. So we waited, still blindly confident in
the sincerity of Turkey's friendship for England, while the mobilisation
of the Turkish forces proceeded merrily. By the end of September this
was nearly complete, and quite suddenly the Ambassador informed the
Foreign Office that Turkey appeared to be temporising. That was
perfectly true, but the period of temporisation was nearly over, and by
mid-October Turkey had something like 800,000 men under arms, and for
nine weeks Enver Pasha had had his signed treaty with Germany in his
pocket. Possibly this diplomatic procrastination was useful to us, for
it enabled us to bring troops from India in security, and send others to
Egypt. But without doubt it was useful to the Turks, for it enabled them
to mobilise their armies, and to strengthen enormously