n there
is continuance and equality of service; but in the case of benefactor
and benefited, in deeds of charity, in fact, there is no such equality.
The satisfaction is on one side but often not on the other. (The dilemma
is one that is pressed, though not satisfactorily, in Cicero and
Seneca.) The reason for this will be found, Aristotle suggests, in the
feeling of satisfaction which men experience in action. We realize
ourselves in our deeds--throw ourselves into them, as people say; and
this is happiness. What we make we like: it is part of us. On the other
hand, in the person benefited there may be no corresponding action, and
in so far as there is not, there is no exchange of service or the
contentment that arises from it. The "self" of the recipient is not
drawn out. On the contrary, he may be made worse, and feel the
uneasiness and discontent that result from this. In truth, to complete
Aristotle's argument, the good deed on one side, as it represents the
best self of the benefactor, should on the other side draw out the best
self of the person benefited. And where there is not ultimately this
result, there is not effective friendship or charity, and consequently
there is no personal or social satisfaction. The point may be pushed
somewhat further. In recent developments of charitable work the term
"friendly visitor" is applied to persons who endeavour to help families
in distress on the lines of associated charity. It represents the work
of charity in one definite light. So far as the relation is mutual, it
cannot at the outset be said to exist. The charitable friend wishes to
befriend another; but at first there may be no reciprocal feeling of
friendship on the other's part--indeed, such a feeling may never be
created. The effort to reciprocate kindness by becoming what the friend
desires may be too painful to make. Or the two may be on different
planes, one not really befriending, but giving without intelligence, the
other not really endeavouring to change his nature, but receiving help
solely with a view to immediate advantage. The would-be befriender may
begin "despairing of no man," expecting nothing in return; but if, in
fact, there is never any kind of return, the friendship actually fails
of its purpose, and the "friend's" satisfaction is lost, except in that
he may "have loved much." In any case, according to this theory
friendship, love and charity represent the mood from which spring social
acts, the