Panaetius
(185-112 B.C.), and used by Cicero in his _De Officiis_, became in the
hands of St Ambrose arguments for the direction of the clergy in the
founding of the medieval church; and in the 13th century Aristotle
reasserts his influence through such leaders of medieval thought as St
Thomas Aquinas. St Paul's chapters on charity, not fully appreciated
and understood, one is inclined to think, have perhaps more than any
other words prevented an absolute lapse into the materialism of
almsgiving. After him we think of St Francis, the greatest of a group of
men who, seeking reality in life, revived charity; but to the theory of
charity it might almost be said that since Aristotle and St Paul nothing
has been added until we come to the economic and moral issues which Dr
Chalmers explained and illustrated.

The problem turns on the conception (1) of purpose, (2) of the self, and
(3) of charity, love or friendship as an active force in social life. To
the Greek, or at least to Greek philosophic thought, purpose was the
measure of goodness. To have no purpose was, so far as the particular
act was concerned, to be simply irrational; and the less definite the
purpose the more irrational the act. This conception of purpose was the
touchstone of family and social life, and of the civic life also. In no
sphere could goodness be irrational. To say that it was without purpose
was to say that it was without reality. So far as the actor was
concerned, the main purpose of right action was the good of the soul
([Greek: psyche]); and by the soul was meant the better self, "the
ruling part" acting in harmony with every faculty and function of the
man. With faculties constantly trained and developed, a higher life was
gradually developed in the soul. We are thus, it might be said, what we
become. The gates of the higher life are within us. The issue is whether
we will open them and pass in.

Consistent with this is the social purpose. Love or friendship is not
conceived by Aristotle except in relation to social life. Society is
based on an interchange of services. This interchange in one series of
acts we call justice; in another friendship or love. A man cannot be
just unless he has acquired a certain character or habit of mind; and
hence no just man will act without knowledge, previous deliberation and
definite purpose. So also will a friend fulfil these conditions in his
acts of love or friendship. In the love existing between good me