her in
those qualities which constitute her efficiency and make her formidable
as a foe. This we must do, or we must quietly surrender our commerce to
her infamous depredations, and acknowledge ourselves beaten on the seas
by the rebel confederacy without an open port, and without anything
worthy to be called a navy. The ability of our naval heroes, and their
skill and valor, so nobly illustrated on several occasions during the
present war, will be utterly unavailing against superior celerity of
motion. Their just pride must be humbled, and their patriotic hearts
must chafe with vexation, so long as the terrible rebel rover continues
to command the seas, as she will not fail to do so long as we are unable
to cope with her in activity and speed. Nor is it certain we have yet
known the worst. Ominous appearances abroad, and thick-coming rumors
brought by every arrival, indicate the construction in England of
numerous other ships like the Alabama, destined to run the blockade and
afterward to join that renowned cruiser in her work of destruction.
Stores of cotton held in Southern ports offer a temptation to the
cupidity of foreign adventurers which will command capital to any
amount, and the best skill of English engineers and builders will be
enlisted to make the enterprise successful--a skill not embarrassed by
bureaucratic inertia and stolidity.

Let the genius of American constructors and engineers be brought to bear
on the subject, and the important problem will be solved in sixty days.
Indeed, there are plans in existence, at this very hour, by which the
desired end could be at once accomplished. But the inertia of official
authority, and especially of the bureaus in the Navy Department, is such
that any novel idea, however demonstrably good and valuable, is usually
doomed to battle for years against opposition of all kinds before it can
hope to secure an introduction. In all probability, the war will have
been ended before anything of great importance ever can be accomplished
through those channels. The adoption of the Monitor principle was not
due to the skill and intelligence found in official quarters; it was
forced upon the Navy Department from the outside. And like the boa
constrictor, after having swallowed its prey, the Department must
sluggishly repose until that meal is digested before another can be
taken. One idea, of the magnitude of this, is enough for the present
crisis. We shall not have another, if