ss his case unfairly is another proof of the excellence of our
system, which contrasts favourably in this respect with the badgering
and the prolonged moral torture to which a French prisoner is subject.
Reforms, however, are needed which will not weaken these excellences.
The absence of any plan for interrogating the prisoner avoids the abuses
of the French system, but is often a cruel hardship upon the innocent.
'There is a scene,' he says, 'which most lawyers know by heart, but
which I can never hear without pain.' It is the scene when the prisoner,
confused by the unfamiliar surroundings, and by the legal rules which he
does not understand, tries to question the adverse witness, and muddles
up the examination with what ought to be his speech for the defence,
and, not knowing how to examine, is at last reduced to utter perplexity,
and thinks it respectful to be silent. He mentions a case by which he
had been much impressed, in which certain men accused of poaching had
failed, from want of education and familiarity with legal rules, to
bring out their real defence. An unlucky man, for example, had asked
questions about the colour of a dog, which seemed to have no bearing
upon the case, but which, as it afterwards turned out, incidentally
pointed to a fact which identified the really guilty parties. He thinks
that the interrogation of the prisoner might be introduced under such
restrictions as would prevent any unfair bullying, and yet tend both to
help an innocent man and to put difficulties in the way of sham or false
defences of the guilty. This question, I believe, is still unsettled. I
will not dwell upon other suggestions. I will only observe that he is in
favour of some codification of the criminal law; though he thinks that
enough would be done by re-enacting, in a simpler and less technical
form, the six 'Consolidation Acts' of 1861. He proposes, also, the
formation of a Ministry of Justice which would in various ways direct
the administration of the law, and superintend criminal legislation.
Briefly, however, I am content to say that, while he starts from
Bentham, and admits Bentham's fundamental principles, he has become
convinced by experience that Bentham's onslaught upon 'judge-made law,'
and legal fictions, and the 'fee-gathering' system, was in great part
due to misunderstanding. The law requires to be systematised and made
clear rather than to be substantially altered. It is, on the whole, a
'generous, h