of his looking at the world not
through books or through the theories of books, but through his own
eyes. He is sceptical because he sees that any one who wishes to live
in harmony with the facts of life must be sceptical. Life is made up
of such evasive entangled confused elements that any other attitude
than this one is a noble madness if it is not knavish hypocrisy. The
theories, convictions, moralities, opinions, of every child of Adam
are subject to lamentable upheavals, as the incorrigible earth-gods,
with their impish malice, seize them and play nine-pins with them.

"All flows away and nothing remains," says the ancient philosopher,
and Montaigne shows clearly enough how vain it is to put our trust
in any theory or system or principle or idea.

It is a mistake to regard his scepticism as merely negative. It is far
more than that. Like all wise scepticism it is creative and
constructive; not out of theories and phrases, nor out of principles
and opinions, but out of events and persons and passions and
instincts and chances and occasions.

It is realistic--this Montaignesque method--realistic not materialistic.
It takes each occasion as it occurs, each person as he presents
himself, each passion, each instinct, each lust, each emotion, and out
of these he creates a sort of piece-meal philosophy; modest enough
and making no claim to finality, but serving us, at a pinch, as a sort
of rough-and-ready clue through the confusions of life.

It will always appear presumptuous to the dogmatic type of mind,
the mind made up of rationalistic and logical exigencies, to call
scepticism like this by the name of "philosophy." It will be still more
obscure to such a mind how it is possible for a human being to live
happily and joyfully in a complete absence of any synthetic system.

And yet one feels certain enough that amid the jolts and jars and
shocks of actual life even the most idealistic of philosophers leave
their logic to shift for itself and just drift on as they may in the
groove of traditional usages or the track of temperamental bias.

It must not, however, be for a moment supposed that the scepticism
of Montaigne is identical with the so-called "pragmatism" of
William James or with the "instinct theories" of Bergson.

Both of these modern attitudes make the assumption that a genuine
advance in our knowledge of "truth" is really possible; though
possible along quite different lines from the old absolute dogma