sing its colours. Moral
scruples, for instance, as to how precisely this new fragment of
knowledge or this new aspect of art is likely to affect the
inclinations of the younger generation; religious scruples as to
whether this particular angle of cosmic vision will redound to the
glory of God or detract from it or diminish it; political or patriotic
scruples as to whether this particular "truth" we have come to
overtake will have a beneficial or injurious effect upon the fortunes
of our nation; domestic scruples as to whether we are justified In
emphasising some aspect of psychological discrimination that may
be dangerous to those stately and ideal illusions upon which the
more sacred of human institutions rest.

Looked at from this point of view it might seem as if it were almost
impossible for a thoroughly responsible or earnest-minded man to
become an ideal critic. Such a one keeps his mind so closely and
gravely fixed upon his ethical "point d'appui," that when he jumps
he misses the object altogether. In a certain sense every form of
responsibility is obscurantism. We are concerned with something
external to the actual thing under discussion; something to be gained
or lost or betrayed or guarded; and between the pure image of what
we are looking at and our own free souls, float a thousand distorting
mists.

The whole philosophical attitude of Remy de Gourmont is full of
interest and significance for those who are watching the deeper
movements of European thought. At one, in a limited sense, with
Bergson and William James in their protests against final or static
"truth," de Gourmont's writings, when taken as a whole, form a most
salutary and valuable counterpoise to the popular and vulgar
implications of this modern mysticism. That dangerous and
pernicious method of estimating the truth of things according to
what James calls somewhere their "cash-value" receives blow after
blow from his swift and ironic intelligence.

Things are what they are and their hidden causes are what they are,
quite apart from whether they produce a pleasant or unpleasant
effect upon individual lives. The sordid and utilitarian system of
judging the value of thoughts and ideas in proportion to their
efficiency in the world of practical exigencies does not appeal to this
rational and classical mind.

The pragmatism of William James and the instinct-doctrines of
Bergson have both been pounced upon by every kind of apologist
for supern