hem
and the law to back, submit to the dictation of one small judge armed
with nothing better than an insolent assumption of authority? A judge
has not the moral right to order a jury to acquit, the utmost that he
can rightly do is to point out what state of the law or facts may seem
to him unfavorable to conviction. If the jurors, holding a different
view, persist in conviction the accused will have grounds, doubtless,
for a new trial. But under no circumstances is a judge justified in
requiring a responsible human being to disregard the solemn obligation
of an oath.

The public ear is dowered with rather more than just enough of clotted
nonsense about "attacks upon the dignity of the Bench," "bringing the
judiciary into disrepute" and the rueful rest of it. I crave leave
to remind the solicitudinarians sounding these loud alarums on their
several larynges that by persons of understanding men are respected, not
for what they do, but for what they are, and that one public functionary
will stand as high in their esteem as another if as high in character.
The dignity of a wise and righteous judge needs not the artificial
safeguarding which is a heritage of the old days when if dissent found a
tongue the public executioner cut it out. The Bench will be sufficiently
respected when it is no longer a place where dullards dream and rogues
rob--when its _personnel_ is no longer chosen in the back-rooms of
tipple-shops, forced upon yawning conventions and confirmed by the votes
of men who neither know what the candidates are nor what they should be.
With the gang that we have and under our system must continue to have,
respect is out of the question and ought to be. They are entitled to
just as much of its forms and observances as are needful to maintenance
of order in their courts and fortification of their lawful power--no
more. As to their silence under criticism, that is as they please. No
body but themselves is holding their tongues.

II.

A law under which the unsuccessful respondent in a divorce proceeding
may be forbidden to marry again during the life of the successful
complainant, the latter being subject to no such disability, is
infamous infinitely. If the disability is intended as a punishment it
is exceptional among legal punishments in that it is inflicted without
conviction, trial or arraignment, the divorce proceedings being quite
another and different matter. It is exceptional in that the period
of it