onditions
familiar to him--makes him accessible to just such influences and
suasions as he is accustomed to when making conscious and unconscious
decisions in his personal affairs.

There may be a distinct gain to justice in permitting a witness to
say whatever he wants to say. If he is telling the truth he will not
contradict himself; if he is lying the more rope he is given the more
surely he will entangle himself. To the service of that end defendants
and prisoners should, I think, be compelled to testify and denied the
advantage of declining to answer, for silence is the refuge of guilt
In endeavoring by austere means to make an accused person incriminate
himself the French judge logically applies the same principle that a
parent uses with a suspected child. When the Grandfather of His Country
arraigned the wee George Washington for arboricide the accused was not
carefully instructed that he need not answer if a truthful answer would
tend to convict him. If he had refused to answer he would indubitably
have been lambasted until he did answer, as right richly he would have
deserved to be.

The custom of permitting a witness to wander at will over the entire
field of knowledge, hearsay, surmise and opinion has several distinct
advantages over our practice. In giving hearsay evidence, for example,
he may suggest a new and important witness of whom the counsel for the
other side would not otherwise have heard, and who can then be brought
into court. On some unguarded and apparently irrelevant statement he may
open an entirely new line of inquiry, or throw upon the case a flood
of light. Everyone knows what revelations are sometimes evoked by
apparently the most insignificant remarks. Why should justice be denied
a chance to profit that way?

There is a still greater advantage in the French "method." By giving a
witness free rein in expression of his personal opinions and feelings we
should be able to calculate his frame of mind, his good or ill will
to the prosecution or defense and, therefore, to a certain extent his
credibility. In our courts he is able by a little solemn perjury to
conceal all this, even from himself, and pose as an impartial witness,
when in truth, with regard to the accused, he is full of rancor or
reeking with compassion.

In theory our system is perfect. The accused is prosecuted by a public
officer, who having no interest in his conviction, will serve the State
without mischievous zeal and